

REBALANCING THE MILITARY ROLE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

REBALANCING THE MILITARY ROLE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

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While the Department of State (DoS) is charged with leading foreign affairs efforts for the United States (U.S.), the Department of Defense (DoD) has in recent years gained greater influence in this realm, resulting in what has been characterized as a militarized foreign policy. This is a result of a rise in influence of Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), a migration of non-traditional roles to DoD, and cutbacks to DoS that have impacted the department's effectiveness internationally. After reviewing the arguments that illustrate why a militarized foreign policy is problematic, this strategic research paper discusses the need for change in how foreign policy is managed. It acknowledges the significant institutional changes currently underway at the national level, and focuses primarily upon how these might be used to lay a solid foundation for re-structuring of foreign policy execution at the regional level. It reviews several options for such changes, and advocates from these that the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) be transformed into DoS-led Regional Engagement Teams (RETs), thereby ensuring that foreign policy execution is re-balanced in favor of civilian control, and that international engagement is distributed appropriately across various USG departments.

REBALANCING THE MILITARY ROLE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The Department of State (DoS) is charged with leading the foreign policy efforts of the United States (U.S.). However, the Department of Defense (DoD) has emerged in recent years as the dominant player, resulting in what many have characterized as an overly militarized foreign policy. The shift toward DoD dominance can be attributed in part to the growth in influence of regional Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in the post-Cold War era. The shift also resulted from the migration of non-core military missions to DoD, due to its greater resources and capacity. The growing imbalance was further exacerbated by resource constraints, personnel reductions and structural changes that adversely affected DoS mission performance during this period.

This research paper begins with a review of three compelling arguments that illustrate the impact of a DoD-favored foreign policy imbalance. The first of these suggests that the military is not always the correct foreign policy tool for a given situation and improper use has far reaching consequences. Second, since DoD has assumed so many non-core military tasks, there is growing concern about whether DoD will become overstressed and lose focus on its core missions. A third argument is that DoS and other U.S. government (USG) agencies will continue to atrophy if militarized foreign policy remains unchecked.

In the context of these arguments, the second half of this paper advocates reversing the trend of foreign policy militarization through comprehensive changes to foreign policy management at the national and regional levels. Significant institutional changes are already underway at the national level. However, more attention is required at the regional level, where foreign policy is largely executed. Three distinct options to

address regional level change are reviewed here. This research concludes that the most promising option involves fundamental transformation of Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) into Regional Engagement Teams (RETs), fully empowered DoS-led organizations responsible for all USG activities in a given region except major combat operations. In three ways this serves as the best approach to successfully balance the military's role in foreign policy execution. First, it places DoS in the leadership role. Next, it limits the use of combat oriented terminology, in favor of terms focusing on engagement. Finally, it offers a much needed framework to build long term civilian capacity where it is most essential, at the regional level.

Background

DoS is charged with leading U.S. foreign policy. Its authority derives from the U.S. Constitution and public law. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution empowers the President to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, with the “advice and consent” of the Senate.¹ Although the U.S. Congress also has a Constitutional role in foreign policy, through precedent and practice, primary responsibility for policy development and execution resides with the Executive branch. By Title XXII, United States Code (USC), this responsibility has been delegated to the Secretary of State (SecState).² This area of public law addresses the Foreign Service, foreign assistance, development and investment programs, diplomatic missions, and a host of other DoS-specific activities relative to U.S. foreign policy. Foreign policy guidance is also contained in various Presidential decision documents and national strategy documents. For instance, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, signed by President Bush in 2005, was a key recent directive addressing DoS authority.

It states: "The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated U.S. government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."³

Despite what appears to be significant guidance defining USG agency roles, DoD dominance in foreign policy activities has grown in the post-Cold War era, creating an imbalance and militarization of foreign policy. There are various reasons for this imbalance. First, CCDRs gained increased influence with passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This law "...represents the first discernable effort to expand the [CCDRs'] powers with legislation increasing their responsibilities and influence as warfighters."⁴ Perhaps the most compelling aspect of this legislation was the broad regional authority given to CCDRs, compared to DoS and other USG agencies, which engage primarily at country level. With such a wide area of responsibility, foreign leaders often showed greater deference to CCDRs than to U.S. ambassadors. During one event, the CCDR "...was officially outranked by six U.S. ambassadors...but...was the one who sat in the procession's lead car and the only one who slept in a luxurious hotel suite patrolled by two dozen security agents."⁵ In addition, the well-resourced and organized GCCs offered a coherent framework to execute foreign policy activities. "Culturally and organizationally, the [GCCs] are by far the most structured tools with which the U.S. can wield all the elements of its national power."⁶ Furthermore, DoD and the GCCs have had a great deal of success in establishing long term relationships and contacts, based in part on the significant resources, training, and other capabilities they can bring to a region. National leaders often see "...proactive peacetime engagement as a way to achieve national strategy objectives."⁷ Direct

military-to-military contact, joint exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance are just some of the military tools employed to achieve significant foreign policy impact. The International Military Education and Training (IMET), for instance, exposes students from allied and friendly nations "...to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including amongst other things, U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law."⁸ Although IMET is funded and administered by DoS, it is implemented by DoD and foreign policy influence in the program is primarily achieved through foreign military students interacting with U.S. military contemporaries. CCDRs have also commented on the amount of time they personally spend on issues within their regions that reinforce the notion of greater influence beyond military activities.

General Joseph Ralston estimates he spent about 70 percent of his time on political-military issues, despite ongoing combat operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia...[and] up to 80 percent of his political-military time with various national ambassadors to NATO, heads of state, members of parliament, ministers of defense and military chiefs of defense.⁹

Another indication that foreign policy has become too militarized is migration of DoD into non-traditional roles in the post Cold War era, including peacetime engagement, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and stabilization activities.¹⁰ From one perspective, "...the Clinton administration started expanding the role of the commands by tasking them with the mission to shape their regions using multilateral approaches in ways that exceeded the traditional role of the military."¹¹ The trend continued in the next administration under President Bush, who "...allowed Rumsfeld to take over tasks traditionally ascribed to the State Department and USAID in the name of efficiency...."¹² Such activities include peacetime cooperation to maintain friendly

relations. For example, PACOM conducts significant non-military engagement to promote friendly relations, such as activities focused on improving economics, medical care, education, and the like. "Peace and stability are the watch words in all the countries we visit, all of them."¹³ Similar activities occur in other regions like SOUTHCOM.

One thing we did last summer was deploy the USNS Comfort, a hospital ship which had 400,000 patient encounters, performed 1,200 surgeries, immunized 32,000 patients, trained 28,000 medical students and technicians, handed out 25,000 pairs of eyeglasses, and thus made a real difference in people's lives in a dozen different countries....¹⁴

Although use of the military in situations other than combat is not new, the heightened level of engagement in the post Cold War era appears to contribute to the imbalance in foreign policy execution.

DoD dominance in foreign policy also emerged as a result of resource constraints, personnel reductions, and structural changes that adversely affected DoS mission performance during this period.

In many ways...key instruments of U.S. power abroad were reduced or allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine. The State Department froze the hiring of new Foreign Service Officers. The U.S. Agency for International Development dropped from a high of having 15,000 permanent staff members during the Vietnam War to having less than 3,000 today...the U.S. Information Agency...was split into pieces and folded into a corner of the State Department.¹⁵

What started in the 1990s has proceeded until today: "This year, the American military will add 7,000 more soldiers to its ranks; meanwhile, 1,000 American diplomatic posts are vacant because the Foreign Service is so short-staffed."¹⁶ DoS has been sounding the alarm for quite some time and DoD leadership is now echoing these concerns.

It has become clear that America's civil institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long - relative to what we spend on the military, and more important,

relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.¹⁷

Over time, personnel changes at DoS appear to have diluted some core competencies.

"The development arm of the State Department, USAID, has been gutted to the point that the organization is now a clearinghouse for the allotment of contractors for development work, rather than a working reserve of development and governance advisors."¹⁸ These issues are not limited to USAID.

Public diplomacy has for decades been a State Department preserve, although its standing and funding have withered since 1999, when the U.S. Information Agency was merged into the department. Before September 11, 2001, the Defense Department was a bit player in this arena. In recent years, however...the Pentagon's money and manpower have put its strategic communications activities in a position where in many key countries they have equaled or exceeded the efforts of State's Foreign Service Officers.¹⁹

Organizational issues also contribute to foreign policy imbalance. Consider CCDR activities relative to individual ambassadors and country teams. Using CENTCOM as an example, the CCDR is the consolidated DoD focal point for the entire region. However, because DoD's Unified Command Plan (UCP) regional boundaries do not match DoS' regional boundaries, and DoS usually engages at the country level, DoS has three Regional Assistant Secretaries and 27 separate country teams with a role in the region.²⁰ DoD's construct appears to be advantageous, in terms of efficiency, coordination and streamlined decision making.

Impact of Foreign Policy Imbalance

With DoD in the lead on so many activities, U.S. national leaders have begun to acknowledge the pendulum swing has gone too far and action should be taken to correct it. "For too long, we've put the bulk of the burden, in my view, on our military.

That's a view not only shared by me, but your Secretary of Defense, as well."²¹ This point was echoed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Mullen, who stated: "You've heard us...talk about our foreign policy being too militarized. I believe that. And it's got to change."²² With such strong views from national leadership, it is important to consider why the imbalance favoring DoD is problematic if allowed to continue.

Given the various challenges in the current global security environment, the military is not always the appropriate element of power to exert, nor is it the only tool available. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during the 1980s and early 1990s offers a relevant case study for the notion of a more broad-based policy outlook.

Washington enthusiastically supported the insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980s with billions of dollars in the name of containment; but when it came to stabilizing the country following the Soviet-Afghan war, Washington could not find a dime for development and governance promotion....²³

The realization of increasing foreign policy imbalance led to improvements captured in key policy documents. For instance, U.S. experiences in Bosnia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia informed PDD 56, which states: "We have learned that effective responses...may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security..."²⁴ Referenced earlier, the more recent NSPD 44 embraced a balanced, multi-agency USG approach to reconstruction and stabilization activities. Furthermore, the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006, clearly linked U.S. national security with development and stabilization activities around the globe. Despite these national level attempts to establish effective balance, however, "...real reform has not been forthcoming."²⁵

With the long-term U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, added to the host of other ways in which the military has gone beyond its core mandate, current national leaders are asserting that are other tools available to preserve U.S. security interests.

Direct military force will continue...but over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit.²⁶

From one point of view, unnecessary reliance on the military over other tools of policy perpetuates an overly aggressive foreign policy. Whether in combat or peaceful engagement, employment of U.S. forces is not always viewed as positive by others.

This is particularly true of the U.S. involvement in Iraq from 2003 until the present, which many still believe was a war of choice rather than necessity.

Moreover, America's image abroad has significantly eroded in recent years, making it difficult to persuade international partners and allies to continue their participation in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and hampering the ability of U.S. diplomats to make progress on key international issues.²⁷

Some have suggested that military dominance in foreign policy signals nothing less than U.S. expansionism, or even imperialism.

The warning for Washington back in 2003...was that the United States should not reorient its foreign policy on the basis of its success in Afghanistan and the concomitant assumption that the [Revolution in Military Affairs] could underwrite neo-imperial American foreign policy....²⁸

While this assessment seems excessive, it does comprise part of the current debate. It is more reasonable to characterize the predominant international position regarding a militarized U.S. foreign policy as one of heightened concern rather than outright fear.

One additional point warrants consideration. Although there has been a concerted effort to emphasize GCC engagement over combat functions, it is easy to see how the very

title *Combatant* Commander, one of inherent force and power, may engender feelings other than cooperation or partnership. The recent standup of AFRICOM highlights this point.

This apparent 'militarization' of U.S. foreign policy, though transparent to most of the domestic audience, is glaringly obvious to a foreign audience acutely aware of shifts in U.S. policy--particularly in Africa where USAFRICOM is being met with 'less than euphoria' in many states. For instance, African nations are concerned that the command will incite, not preclude, terrorist attacks....²⁹

Since the military has assumed so many additional tasks over time, there is concern about whether DoD can effectively focus on its long term core missions. A sentiment exists that "...the diplomatic and nation-building missions drain resources and dull the armed services' ability to fight and win wars."³⁰ While it is true that military forces have long played a role in non-combat activities such as post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, humanitarian assistance, and engagement, it does not logically follow that DoD must lead or be the predominant force in these endeavors. One study noted that "...in nearly every operation from Somalia to Iraq, a lack of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities has left military forces performing tasks for which they do not have a comparative advantage, and has extended the duration of their deployments."³¹ The trend of DoD being assigned roles that may distract from its core missions indicates task migration driven largely by necessity, resulting in the emergence of valid concerns about military readiness for other operations. Performing tasks like stabilization and reconstruction "...have 'stretched' the military, and as such, we're doing things that we hadn't planned on doing...had not trained to do."³² In addition to stressing personnel, each added or extended non-core mission requires increased funding. However, in the context of today's global economic turmoil and domestic financial

concerns, current DoD funding levels cannot be sustained. "We will not be able to 'do everything, buy everything.'"³³ In this environment, hard choices will eventually dictate whether DoD can continue performing such non-core missions.

The imbalance in foreign policy favoring the military appears to have an adverse impact on other USG agencies such as DoS, who would be able to lessen the burden on DoD if properly empowered, structured, and resourced. As stated earlier, national leaders envision greater foreign policy engagement by non-DoD agencies over time. However, "...it could take 10 years or more before government departments...such as State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture are prepared to send employees overseas to assume roles now being played by the military in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots."³⁴ Beyond DoS, the problem of building capacity in other USG agencies is significant. Such agencies were not built, staffed, or resourced for external engagement. "Many agencies are not conscious of or prepared to act in their national security roles."³⁵ Since civilian capacity will take time to develop, DoD will likely continue to shoulder the burden of regional engagement activities until sufficient resources and capacity can be realigned. Within the USG, the pertinent concern is how long DoD's role can be sustained without truly sacrificing warfighting missions. These concerns drive the need for sound solutions to correct the U.S. foreign policy imbalance.

Fixing the Imbalance

Rebalancing foreign policy within the USG will require comprehensive changes at the national and regional levels. Significant institutional changes are already underway at the national level. Firstly, the current administration has set a clear vision by articulating specific and achievable national goals. According to the published White

House agenda, some of the top priorities for DoD include: develop whole-of-government initiatives for stability; build capacity to deploy non-DoD agencies; create a Civilian Assistance Corps; better engage allies; and expand humanitarian activities.³⁶ The new agenda also includes specific goals for foreign policy, which directly complement the goals listed above: make diplomacy a priority; renew alliances; expand diplomatic presence; and deepen civilian capacity to work with the military.³⁷ Through such priorities, the administration has established a foundation to guide rebalancing foreign policy over the next several years. A second significant change envisions national level mechanisms being reoriented to emphasize a partnership among diplomacy, development, and defense, rather than overemphasize defense. "The President is committed to making diplomacy and development the partners in our foreign policy, along with defense."³⁸ Strategic communication from national leaders has begun to promote this concept as often as possible. "Most advocates of soft power...realize that is must be combined with hard power, a combination often referred to [as] 'smart power'."³⁹

National leaders have also consistently emphasized a whole-of-government approach to national security and foreign policy.

Today's complex security environment places increased demands on the capabilities and resources of departments and agencies across the U.S. Government. Individually, departments and agencies are not as effective as when we unify our actions toward achieving a common vision.⁴⁰

The goal is to have all USG agencies act in concert during ongoing conflicts, as well as during normal peacetime operations, relying on many areas of expertise and talent throughout government, rather than overreliance on the military.

The desired end state is for U.S. Government national security partners to develop plans and conduct operations from a shared perspective...to plan,

organize, train, and employ integrated, mutually-supporting capabilities to achieve unified action at home and abroad.⁴¹

This vision goes beyond DoD, DoS, and the National Security Council (NSC) to include "...the Energy Department, Commerce Department and Treasury, all the law enforcement agencies...to embrace a broader membership."⁴² The move for more balance is not limited to USG agencies. It also includes U.S. friends, allies and international partners: "Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches-- primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces..."⁴³ In all of this, it must be stressed that the military's role in foreign policy will not disappear, but simply recede enough to enable more effective use of soft power elements.

One big step forward is the reorganization and empowerment of the NSC via Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 1. This directive will better integrate critical activities of key USG agencies in all areas of national security policy, including domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and economic. In addition to expanding NSC participation beyond traditionally core elements of DoD and DoS, PPD 1 established Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) to broaden USG agency involvement in coordinating national security issues.⁴⁴ Re-crafting the NSC and national mechanisms provides the necessary foundation to implement required changes at the regional level, where foreign policy execution is of extreme importance.

In addition to foundational changes at the NSC, the Interagency Management System (IMS), managed through the DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), has grown in operational use and effectiveness since its inception in 2004. IMS was created in response to NSPD 44 to provide "...policymakers

in Washington, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and military commanders with flexible tools to achieve integrated planning processes...funding requests, joint interagency field deployments, and a joint civilian operations capability...."⁴⁵ With additional capabilities for deployed and reserve civilian elements, this initiative directly addresses many of the issues related to overreliance on the military noted earlier in this paper. However, long term budgetary commitment by Congress, including increased personnel for DoS, will be required for successful evolution of this capability.

Significant progress is being made at the national level; however, additional work is needed at the regional level. The administration's recently announced approach to the Middle East, in Iraq and Afghanistan specifically, reinforces that future emphasis will be placed on regional engagement under primarily civilian leadership.

That is why we are renewing our diplomacy, while relieving the burden on our military...And that is why we have named three of America's most accomplished diplomats – George Mitchell, Dennis Ross and Richard Holbrooke – to support Secretary Clinton and me as we carry forward this agenda.⁴⁶

The President and SecState recently gave details about how the evolving regional engagement strategy will work, using Afghanistan as an example.

Ambassador Holbrooke will coordinate across the entire government an effort to achieve United States' strategic goals in this region...not only within the State Department...but also with the Defense Department and under the coordination of the National Security Council.⁴⁷

Speaking on his efforts to create a more coherent program with military commanders in the region, Ambassador Holbrooke noted: "If our resources are mobilized and coordinated and pulled together, we can...multiply by tenfold the effectiveness of our efforts there."⁴⁸ Using this approach, DoD will remain fully engaged through GCCs and subordinate commands in the region. However, military dominance in foreign policy will

be reduced. "...The solution is certainly not to diminish the scope of the [CCDRs'] reach.' Instead, military and civilian alike should promote what Cohen calls 'the unequal dialogue:' a free-wheeling, honest discussion wherein civilians have the final say."⁴⁹

Appointment of regional special envoys was likely used in this case because existing structures were not in place to accommodate more permanent non-military options. At issue is how far the USG should go in rebalancing civilian and military resources for engagement at this level: "Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, you probably don't hear this often from a Secretary of Defense, it is important that the military is – and is clearly seen to be – in a supporting role to civilian agencies."⁵⁰

There is a wide variety of options to bring about such fundamental change. This paper will next examine three specific proposals that represent a good cross-section of key ideas, and recommend a way ahead to address the problem of reducing military influence and growing civilian capacity in U.S. foreign policy execution.

Many believe the new AFRICOM model is an excellent construct to boost civilian involvement, advance interagency cooperation, and put a less militaristic face on foreign policy. "AFRICOM is pioneering a new way...Through persistent engagement with our African partners and integration of...USG-wide expertise into our structure...."⁵¹ The command is led by a four-star military commander with a civilian deputy from DoS. Additionally, the command includes interagency partners from Treasury, Commerce, USAID, USDA, and others as integral members of the CCDR's staff. One similar proposal calls for increased involvement by the CCDR's political advisor (POLAD) as a "...single, existing, cross-functional position that could integrate regional planning,

consolidate budgets, and track most of the military assistance and development money flowing into a region."⁵² This proposal also calls for including U.S. country ambassadors in regional level planning and assigning one-star military deputies to the DoS regional assistant secretaries in Washington, D.C.⁵³

While this model appears to boost the role of civilian leadership and enhance greater interagency cooperation with the military, it does not adequately address the driving concerns of the current imbalance in foreign policy. First, despite the bolstered role of civilians, both as deputies and throughout the staff structure, the CCDR remains in charge and remains the primary face of U.S. foreign policy at the regional level. Further, it does little to account for the seams created by the DoD regional approach versus DoS' primarily country-focused approach. Additionally, despite strategic communication attempts to promote AFRICOM's focus on engagement, the designation of "combatant command" and its mission remain solidly military in nature. Finally, although the POLAD concept is valid, it still does not adequately address apparent military bias.

Another approach to this problem recalls the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) model developed during Vietnam.

Taking the CORDS example one step further, our current Geographic Combatant Commands should be redesigned to break their heavy military orientation, and be transformed into truly interagency organizations, under civilian leadership, and prepared to conduct the full spectrum of operations, using all elements of national power within their assigned regions.⁵⁴

These new commands would be led by an ambassador-ranked civilian who would report to the NSC. Each command would have four deputy directors, representing the legs of the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of

power model.⁵⁵ The military deputy would remain commander of military forces in the region. "During conflict, the joint force is the 'supported' agency. In prevention and reconstruction operations, the joint force is the 'supporting' agency."⁵⁶ This idea is beneficial because it directly addresses the root issues of civilian leadership and coordination among interagency structures.

There are, however, concerns associated with the CORDS-derived model. First, the plan calls for the civilian "commander" to report to the NSC. However, even under the new PPD 1 reorganization, the NSC is still meant as a coordination and advisory body. From a basic accountability standpoint, the organization should report through a cabinet level, Senate-confirmed appointee. Second, although civilian leadership is a positive, the construct relies on use of a "command," which still carries a military connotation. Third, as with the AFRICOM model, the plan does not address the role of individual ambassadors and country teams, leaving open the question of who will be primarily responsible for foreign policy engagement in the region. Finally, it remains unclear on precisely when authority would transition from civilian to military in situations where armed conflict exists but is not the predominant military activity (e.g., insurgent activity during post-combat stabilization, reconstruction, or other forms of irregular warfare).

The third construct reviewed in this paper is the Joint Interagency Command (JIACOM); an "...operational-level organization responsible for planning, integrating, and executing all U.S. regional foreign policy."⁵⁷ Similar to the CORDS-derived model, this construct calls for standing civilian-led interagency organizations with regional responsibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy through all phases of operations. This

approach would ensure both unity of action and what the military calls "unity of command" in a given region. The "commander" would be a highly-credentialed civilian who would report directly to the President through the NSC. The concept also includes a four-star military deputy, and would subordinate existing GCC structures to the civilian command lead. As with the AFRICOM model, the structure includes representatives from all USG agencies who would have a formal role in the region. The command would have authority over all agencies below the national level, including ambassadors and country teams.

As with the other models, the JIACOM raises some issues. First, the notion of direct reporting to the President subverts the role of SecState as the leader of U.S. foreign policy, as well as SecDef for military employment. Second, the plan calls for "...tasking authority over all U.S. agencies...up to and including the use of military force."⁵⁸ It is unclear how this provision would apply to committing military forces to and withdrawing them from combat situations, which should remain strictly within the DoD chain of command. Third, the JIACOM model continues the unnecessary use of the term "command," which will always carry a military connotation. Furthermore, use of JIA in the name is unnecessary, since this addresses an internal USG dialogue that many outside the U.S. government may not understand.

While all of the above options are compelling, the JIACOM construct appears to offer the most promise for comprehensive and enduring change to foreign policy implementation at the regional level. To make the concept more viable, the following modifications are recommended, with corresponding rationale. The JIACOM should be officially re-designated as a "Regional Engagement Team (RET)" rather than a

"command." This achieves two important things. First, it replaces an inherently militaristic organizational title with one that carries no military connotation. Second, it emphasizes engagement over combat as the primary purpose of the organization, which reinforces partnership and cooperation as the lead elements of regional policy.

Each RET should be led by a senior civilian with ambassadorial rank, as described in the JIACOM model, yet with the title of Regional Envoy (RE). As noted earlier, this is a variation on the approach being used by the current administration, but would make these positions permanent. The new title would also distinguish the RE position from country level ambassadors. The RE would report through SecState to the President, as DoS is the USG lead agency for foreign policy. Since SecState is a member of the NSC, NSC coordination is embedded into the process via PPD 1. The RET deputy should be the DoD four-star regional commander. As with the title of the RET, use of Geographic Combatant Command should be replaced with Regional Engagement Command (REC).⁵⁹ This reinforces engagement as the primary mission, but acknowledges the role of military force when needed. Under the RET construct, the military deputy would engage the traditional chain of command during times of combat, reporting to SecDef. At all other times, the REC would be subordinate to the RE. This construct is absolutely critical to avert recurrence of mistakes made in Vietnam, where there was an "...attempt to run a war with a peacetime management structure and peacetime practices...and the tendency for problems that did not fit organizations' inherited structures and preferences to fall through the cracks."⁶⁰

All ambassadors within the region would report to the RE. The RET staff should include representatives from the following USG agencies: Treasury, Commerce,

Justice, Agriculture, HHS, Transportation, Education, Homeland Security, and others as dictated by the needs of the region. As with all options discussed above, the staff would be integral to the command, not manned by rotational fills with parent agency allegiances. In addition, all members of RET senior leadership would have access to the entire staff on a daily basis, not just personnel within their specialty. This approach would no longer require Joint-Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs). In addition, RETs should be located at a headquarters within the applicable region, if possible. For PACOM and EUCOM, RETs would simply use existing GCC headquarters. For other current GCCs that do not have permanent forward HQs, such locations should be established to facilitate optimum engagement opportunities. One option is to establish temporary presence at a major embassy within a given region until a forward headquarters can be established. Finally, DoS Regional Assistant Secretaries would remain under this construct, although some consolidation may be warranted, since certain responsibilities and authorities will likely transition to REs.

Comprehensive changes like these come with substantial challenges. First, DoS and other non-military USG agencies would require significant funding and personnel augmentation to fill forward-deployed missions as described above. Such comprehensive change should be performed in a gradual, phased manner, especially in the current global economic environment. It is difficult to project exactly what the costs would be, but some have begun to lay the groundwork.

[One report] calls for an increase of 4,735 personnel for core diplomacy, public diplomacy and foreign assistance diplomacy, at a cost of roughly \$2 billion by FY 2014. In addition, the study calls for \$1.3 billion...to provide the diplomatic corps with the funds and capabilities necessary to respond to emergencies...conduct public diplomacy, and plan security assistance programs.⁶¹

Additionally, non-DoD agencies must continue to develop lasting processes that reinforce effective coordination, planning and decision making, since "...interagency operations are not governed by standard concepts and procedures."⁶² As addressed earlier, the DoD role in foreign policy execution will likely remain strong until sufficient civilian capacity can be established. Since this will not occur overnight, DoD will continue to experience a budget dilemma as they preserve these capabilities while meeting core mission requirements. Finally, the greatest challenge will be gaining congressional support for such comprehensive organizational and resource changes.

The RET construct is most likely to achieve success in rebalancing U.S. foreign policy at the regional level, in the context of national level changes that have taken place or are underway today. First, it places DoS in the leadership role. Next, it limits the use of combat oriented terminology in favor of terms focusing on engagement. Finally, it offers a much needed framework to build long term civilian capacity in regional level foreign policy, the most important level for policy implementation.

Conclusion

Although DoS is charged with leading U.S. foreign policy, DoD emerged in recent years with greater influence in this realm, resulting in an overly militarized foreign policy. This imbalance resulted from the rise in influence of CCDRs, as well as migration of non-traditional roles to DoD, due to its greater resources and capacity. Concurrent with increased DoD influence, resource constraints, personnel reductions and structural changes began to adversely affect DoS mission effectiveness. In view of the compelling arguments that this foreign policy imbalance is problematic, there is a clear need for change at the national and regional levels. Significant institutional changes are already

underway at the national level, laying a solid foundation for required changes at the regional level. To address regional level changes, several attractive options are available. Among these options, transformation of GCCs into DoS-led RETs offers the most promising way to successfully balance the military's role in U.S. foreign policy execution for the long term.

Endnotes

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